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“Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.” So argued 
ecologist Garrett Hardin in “The Tragedy of the 
Commons” in the 13 December 1968 issue of Science 
(1). Hardin questioned society’s ability to manage 
shared resources and avoid an environmentally and 
socially calamitous free-for-all. In the 50 years since, 
the essay has influenced discussions ranging from 
climate change (see page 1217) to evolution, from 
infectious disease to the internet, and has reached far 
beyond academic literature—but not without criticism. 
Considerable work, notably by Nobelist Elinor Ostrom 
(2) , has challenged Hardin, particularly his emphasis on 
property rights and government regulatory leviathans 
as solutions. Instead, research has documented contexts, 
cases, and principles that reflect the ability of groups 
to collectively govern common resources. To mark this 
anniversary and celebrate the richness of research and 
practice around commons and cooperation, Science 
invited experts to share some contemporary views on 
such tragedies and how to avert them. —Brad Wible
GOVERNANCE
Tragedy revisited
Collective actions, cultural norms
By Robert Boyd1 and Peter J. Richerson2
The enduring influence of Hardin’s essay testifies to the power of a 
clear argument. Should a selfish herdsman add animals to his flock? 
The benefit of additional animals flows to the herdsman, while the 
costs are spread among all who share the commons. Each herdsman 
decides to add animals, and the commons is over-grazed. Genes or 
ideas that encourage selflessness will be out-reproduced by those 
that encourage selfishness, so collective action problems can only be 
solved with coercive institutions such as police and courts.
This argument is clear and powerful, but wrong. Many village-
scale human societies have organized hundreds of people to 
produce irrigation works and military action and solve commons 
problems, regulated not by formal coercive institutions but by 
informal, culturally evolved moral norms. Much evidence suggests 
that the propensity to be guided by culturally transmitted beliefs is 
a powerful adaptive tool that has been favored by natural selec-
tion (3). People in every human society acquire moral beliefs about 
what sorts of behaviors are right and wrong, and these beliefs can 
support solutions to collective action problems. For example, in 
the Turkana, an East African pastoral group, hundreds of warriors 
cooperate in cattle raids against other ethnic groups. The Turkana 
have no police, courts, or other formal coercive institutions, but 
cowards and deserters, tempted by selfish motives to free-ride, are 
punished by members of the community (4). Because norm viola-
tors suffer costs, those who adhere to the local norms do better 
than those who don’t. Adherence to norms is self-interested, so 
genes and ideas that undermine successful norms do not spread. 
This means that once they are established, very different norms 
can persist, even in similar environments. To understand why 
norms sometimes support collective action and sometimes don’t, 
we need to understand the processes that shape norm content. 
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Competition among culturally different groups is one such mecha-
nism: Groups with norms that lead to economic success attract 
imitators, and norms that lead to military success spread through 
conquest (5). As societies become larger and more complex, politi-
cal institutions play a major role in determining norm content and 
creating supporting formal institutions. However, there are many 
examples of norm shifts that cannot be explained as a conse-
quence of group competition or deliberate political choices, such 
as the disappearance of norms supporting dueling in 19th-century 
Britain and shifts in norms regarding tobacco smoking, premarital 
sex, and same-sex marriage during the 20th century. 
Although historians provide plausible narratives for particular 
norm shifts (6), plausible quantitative theory is scarce. Models 
based on drift-like random fluctuations make clear predic-
tions but seem too slow to account for change in larger 
societies (7), whereas those based on self-reinforcing 
cascades (8) are fast but depend on an improbable balanc-
ing of processes. We think that developing such a theory 
is crucial for understanding human cooperation. Darwin 
argued in The Descent of Man that selection for coopera-
tion in ancient tribes, acting over the long run, favored 
prosocial emotions such as sympathy and patriotism. 
These emotions, coupled with “approbation of our fellow 
men,” contributed to changes in norms, which in turn supported 
legal initiatives such as the end of slavery in the British Empire in 
1833. We have argued for a modern version of his idea (3, 5).
When societies are small, and collective action problems are 
local, group beneficial norms often spread. The most difficult prob-
lems are those such as climate change that spill over into many 
different societies and require people from societies that share few 
norms or political institutions to create new norms. On the time 
scale of a century, progress in solving global commons problems 
has been impressive. It is not clear that for some problems we 
have another century to spare.
14 DECEMBER 2018 • VOL 362 ISSUE 6420    1237
Playing games in a common pool
By Ruth Meinzen-Dick3
Water is a classic common pool resource: What one person consumes 
is not available for others, and water’s mobility makes it costly to 
exclude other users. But classic studies of irrigation institutions (9) 
showing that people can and do cooperate to sustainably manage 
water have been instrumental in refuting the notion of an inevitable 
tragedy of the commons (2). Yet cooperation does not always emerge 
or survive, particularly in large irrigation systems built and man-
aged by government agencies. Community organizers have been able 
to strengthen irrigation institutions, but this is generally time- and 
labor-intensive and difficult to scale up. Millions of dollars 
have been invested in large-scale programs to introduce, 
formalize, or strengthen water users’ associations, but suc-
cess in such programs has been limited (10). Groundwater 
is particularly problematic because it is a mostly invisible 
resource and it is difficult to understand the boundaries of 
the aquifers and how one person’s use affects others. 
What then can increase collective action over water? A 
strong tradition of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary 
research brings together social sciences with irrigation 
engineering and hydrology, using case studies and comparative stud-
ies (2, 10). Elinor Ostrom identified design principles underlying ef-
fective governance of common resources: clearly defined boundaries, 
rules adapted to local needs, with users’ participation and respected 
by outsiders, monitoring, graduated sanctions, dispute resolution, 
and nested layers of governance that fit the resource system (2). 
In addition to these, water scarcity, type of infrastructure, market 
integration, and social ties among users can all affect cooperation 
over water. For example, when many farmers in India get wells and 
no longer depend on surface irrigation for all their water, they stop 
contributing to the irrigation organizations. Or those at the head end 
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“The enduring influence of Hardin’s essay testifies 
to the power of a clear argument. Should 
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of canals, who get water first, may take too much unless they also 
depend on the tail enders for other things, such as contributions to 
maintain the whole system. 
Behavioral experiments, originally designed as games simulating 
commons dilemmas in the laboratories, have been adapted to be 
played with real commoners in the field. These games have shown 
the importance of communication, repeated interactions, informa-
tion, and perceived fairness of the distribution of costs and ben-
efits in influencing collective action. We are testing whether these 
games could be adapted from a research instrument to a tool that 
can also help water users understand the trade-offs and potential 
value of cooperation. In our groundwater game, players choose 
between crops with different water consumption and profitability 
and see the simulated effects on aquifer sustainability, showing 
that short-term profits by some come at long-term costs borne by 
all. In India, sites where this game was played were significantly 
more likely to adopt rules governing groundwater use, compared 
with control communities (11). 
At a larger scale, multistakeholder participatory processes can 
sometimes create common understanding and consensus about op-
portunities for improving the complex governance of multiple water 
uses and users in river basins, including water quality improvement 
and reservoir reoperation for restoring more natural flow regimes 
in rivers (12). Ostrom’s concepts of polycentric governance (4) and 
the rich literature on multistakeholder platforms and comanage-
ment arrangements between the state and communities (10) provide 
insights—though not blueprints—for ways to better manage water 
commons in the future.  Payment for environmental services 
financed by downstream users such as municipal water systems 
can encourage upstream conservation, such as seen in the Delaware 
County watershed that feeds New York City, but building trust be-
tween government agencies and different types of water users is key. 
Revealing historical resilience 
By Tine De Moor4
The practice of managing and using land and other natural resources 
in common—what the term “commons” originally referred to—has 
a long history. “Commoners” exercised rights to use resources over 
large expanses of permanently uncultivated, or only temporarily cul-
tivated, open country such as heathland, rough pasture, or woodland. 
Commons were an essential component of early modern agriculture 
in many parts of Europe until the 19th century; their disappear-
ance (through enclosures) was a key political issue at the time and 
has been the subject of considerable historiographical debate since. 
Historians, whose work on commons was for a long time mainly 
descriptive, have provided evidence that—contrary to Hardin’s as-
sumption—historical commons were dynamic institutions, with con-
tinuous rule-making, changing, intensive communication between 
the commoners and with effective monitoring mechanisms (13). Con-
trary to arguments in favor of their dissolution, common resources 
were used in an efficient manner, and improvements associated with 
enclosing common land and limiting access to commoners were 
probably not as large as originally thought by reformers (14). 
A more analytic approach to commons’ history, using archival re-
cords for many commons dating back to medieval times (in Europe), 
can provide insights about what makes a self-governing institution 
resilient for major crises and external shocks. After all, true resilience 
can take multiple generations and even centuries to surface. Histori-
cal sources are often still available, in the form of extensive written 
rulebooks, in many cases for commons with a lifetime of several 
hundreds of years during which rules changed frequently (15, 16). 
The reconstruction of these rules demonstrates that regulation often 
adapted to changing circumstances, and that survival over many cen-
turies was not an exception, but the norm. Those rule books provide 
essentially the same type of data as collected through fieldwork by 
Ostrom and colleagues (2), but whereas Ostrom’s list of design prin-
ciples is the common denominator of a large set of commons studied 
at a specific moment in time, the historical data allow for a longitudi-
nal study of the temporal dynamics of a common, of governance that 
needed to adapt or else collapse. An ongoing study of large datasets 
of 30 historical commons across the Netherlands, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom (15) is suggesting some ways in which Ostrom’s list, 
and work building on it, may need to be updated. For example, sanc-
tioning—in particular, graduated sanction, incrementally based on 
the repetition of violations—has been seen as an essential component 
to make self-governing commons work, yet graduated sanctioning is 
hardly ever found in commons surviving more than 200 years (the 
minimum years of survival as set in the study) (17). This suggests 
that in order to achieve long-term survival, this particular type of 
sanctioning may have been less essential than suggested in Ostrom’s 
principles, and that those commons with graduated sanctioning 
in Ostrom’s database may have been through a severe period, with 
many trials and errors of sanctioning, with the graduated version as 
the very last resort. Futhermore, analyzing rules and sanctions over 
the lifetime of several commons, there appears to be an inverse cor-
relation between the effort put into developing sanctions (expressed 
as the number of rules accompanied by a sanction) and the longevity 
of a common (expressed as the number of years between emergence 
and dissolution), suggesting that commons that managed to survive 
longest invested least in designing and applying sanctions (18). This 
counterintuitive result may be explained by the longer-lasting com-
mons investing more time and effort in (compulsory) commoners’ 
meetings, leading to a more thorough understanding by commoners 
of why rules—and changes thereof—were necessary, and possibly, as 
a consequence, leading to less free-riding. Historical analysis can add 
unexpected insights to our understanding of which methods can be 
used to keep commons functioning in the long run, steering them 
away from a tragedy. 
Couple issues to address conflict
By Matthew O. Jackson5,6,7
Over the past five decades, we have come to a deep understanding 
of commons problems and how to solve them: They are not zero-
sum games, but instead offer substantial gains from cooperation. 
Game theory and market design have helped us understand how to 
provide appropriate incentives (19–21). For instance, taxes as well as 
cap-and-trade systems can be designed to make the price of emit-
ting carbon include its ultimate social/climate cost, and subsidies 
can make the prices of alternative technologies reflect their ultimate 
social benefit. However, a challenge with global commons problems 
is that solving the incentive problems often leads the collective gains 
to be distributed very unevenly (22); the costs can even outweigh the 
benefits for some parties.  There are many players with enormous 
differences in wealth and interests around the planet—both within 
and across countries—facing different consequences from commons 
problems and abilities to pay for them. Yet, universal cooperation 
is needed, including coordinated limits and the willingness and the 
ability to enforce those limits. Thus, the main challenges that we 
face are political. Crafting a policy that addresses everyone’s needs 
becomes an even bigger challenge when combined with constantly 
changing political leadership with short-term perspectives and 
impatient citizens who make it difficult to incur large costs today for 
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benefits that may not accrue for decades and involve considerable 
uncertainty and may affect others more than themselves. A natural 
reaction to this is to try to simplify things by concentrating on one 
issue at a time. Although this may seem sensible at first blush, the 
key to crafting policies that address a multitude of conflicting inter-
ests is actually to couple issues together (23). If there is an issue on 
which a group has little to gain and much to lose, then one gets their 
consent by including some other issue on which they have much 
to gain and little to lose. This is a principle underlying omnibus 
legislation: the packaging of unrelated issues into one large bill (24).  
Global organizations such as the United Nations have wide scope 
and can envision such compromise, but they are funded at a handful 
of billions of dollars when tens of trillions are at stake, and they lack 
full international buy-in and trust. The exception is the World Trade 
Organization (WTO); more than half of world gross domestic prod-
uct crosses country borders. However, the WTO’s scope is limited 
to trade agreements. In the absence of a world organization with 
sufficient jurisdiction and large enough carrots and sticks, there is a 
need for the leadership of key countries to step up and craft an omni-
bus agreement that couples commons problems with other issues, 
with something for everyone. Packaging issues produces an attrac-
tive agreement that entices participation, rather than coercing it by 
threatening nonparticipants with trade sanctions that may run afoul 
of existing treaties, fuel a trade war, or be costly to follow through 
with. Coupling global commons problems with other large issues 
will complicate our lives, but it is the only way to forge and enforce 
agreements at an appropriate scale, which everyone will sign onto. 
Without powerful international leadership, large global commons 
problems will continue to be ceded to humanitarian organizations 
and the voluntary behaviors of groups here and there. 
An ocean of opportunity 
By Kristina M. Gjerde8 and Harriet Harden-Davies9
In many ways, the global ocean beyond national boundaries—two-
thirds of the ocean’s surface—epitomises the tragedy of the com-
mons. Access remains difficult to control, resources are declining, 
and pollution pervades the deepest abyss (25). Combined with 
ocean warming, deoxygenation, and acidification, these impacts 
undermine ocean health, productivity, and resilience, exacerbating 
the challenge of achieving equitable and sustainable management 
of our shared ocean (26). 
Since Hardin in 1968, the concept of the global ocean commons 
has evolved. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) tempered the right of States to access resources 
of the high seas and international seabed (“the Area”) with obliga-
tions to build capacity, advance scientific knowledge, and protect 
the environment. UNCLOS further designated the Area and its 
mineral resources as the “common heritage of mankind” to be 
managed by the International Seabed Authority for “the benefit 
of mankind as a whole.” In the 1990s, States acknowledged that 
biodiversity loss and climate change were “common concerns” 
(27). More recently, concepts such as precaution, ecosystem-based 
approaches, and marine protected areas (MPAs) have been incor-
porated into international commitments (27), including United 
Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goal 14.
However, global ocean health remains under threat because 
mechanisms to enable and enforce existing UNCLOS obligations 
remain weak (25). Despite new technologies to monitor activities 
and impacts (28), the current system of managing fishing, ship-
ping, and seabed mining separately begets inconsistent, conflict-
ing, and frequently unsustainable results (25). For example, illegal 
fishing is worse in some places than others; mineral exploration 
rights are being granted atop important fishing, scientific research, 
and cable sites; and biodiversity values are frequently ignored (25). 
Meanwhile, the lack of centralized reporting hinders efforts to 
hold accountable the few that block conservation measures despite 
treaty requirements (27, 29) and compelling evidence of need (26). 
In the Southern Ocean, for instance, compromises made to secure 
consensus for the Ross Sea MPA (29) highlighted the power of a 
very few states to weaken protections. 
Conversely, on the rare occasions that the UN has called on sec-
toral bodies to implement specific requirements to tackle threats 
to biodiversity, substantial progress has been made. A 2006 UN 
resolution requiring states sponsoring bottom fishing to conduct 
prior assessments, adopt measures to avoid substantial impacts, 
and crucially, report to the UN has protected vast areas of the deep 
seabed. However, as ocean stressors multiply, the UN has recog-
nized the need for a more comprehensive approach to biodiversity 
conservation and use (25). 
14 DECEMBER 2018 • VOL 362 ISSUE 6420    1239
Uncoordinated management of fishing, shipping, and seabed mining challenges the health, productivity, and resilience of the global ocean commons.
Published by AAAS
o
n
 M
ay 9, 2019
 
http://science.sciencem
ag.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
INSIGHTS   |   POLICY FORUM
sciencemag.org  SCIENCE
P
H
O
T
O
: 
R
IC
H
A
R
D
 P
A
S
L
E
Y
 -
 D
O
C
T
O
R
 S
T
O
C
K
/
G
E
T
T
Y
 I
M
A
G
E
S
In September, the UN convened the first intergovernmental 
conference to negotiate a legally binding agreement under 
UNCLOS for conservation and sustainable use of marine biodi-
versity beyond national jurisdiction. The negotiations present an 
opportunity to elaborate and modernize existing requirements 
to conduct environmental impact assessments; proactively adopt 
conservation measures, including MPAs; avoid substantial harm to 
biodiversity; and improve accountability through regular report-
ing. The agreement can thus create rules, monitoring systems, and 
sanctioning powers to enhance compliance while ensuring more 
sustainable outcomes at the global, regional, and sectoral levels. 
Science also has a major role to play as a catalyst for unify-
ing stakeholders behind common concerns (30). The agreement 
can boost capacity and understanding by fostering collaboration 
in marine science, knowledge exchange, and technology trans-
fer, including on marine genetic resources (30). The UN Decade 
of Ocean Science 2021–2030 could further facilitate knowledge 
advancement and collective capacity to enable informed, equitable, 
and sustainable management of our global ocean commons. The 
question is, will states adopt the mutual restraints and allocate 
the required resources to evade tragedy and renew ocean health? 
There is hope, but little time. An ambitious agreement is needed 
by 2020 to protect our common interest in a healthy, productive, 
and resilient ocean in the challenging decades to come. 
Common knowledge
By Brett M. Frischmann10, Michael J. Madison11, 
Katherine J. Strandburg12
Intellectual resources have their own tragedy-of-the-commons 
allegory. Replace Hardin’s pasture with an idea, and consider what 
happens when the resource, the idea, is openly accessible to all. 
Everyone who can profitably make use of the idea will do so, as 
much and as often and in whatever manner suits them. But ideas 
are public goods, not common pool resources; ideas are not con-
gested or depleted by overuse. Unlike the pasture, unconstrained 
consumption of ideas seems good, and often it is. 
But there’s a catch. Ideas are products of human intellect, often 
requiring investment of time, effort, and capital. Unconstrained 
consumption by free riders, who invest little or nothing in creating 
the ideas, presents a risk for those who might make such invest-
ments in creating knowledge because they may struggle to recover 
a sufficient return on their investment. Anticipating this, they may 
underinvest, contributing to tragic underproduction of intellectual 
resources.
Avoiding cultural, technological, and scientific stagnation thus 
seems to require collective action to ensure adequate investment 
in knowledge creation. To facilitate this, many analysts assume two 
options: government subsidies or intellectual property-enabled 
markets. Though both are indeed important drivers of knowledge 
production, so are “knowledge commons,” which we should not 
take for granted.
Knowledge commons refers to institutionalized community 
governance of the sharing and, in many cases, creation and cura-
tion of intellectual and cultural resources (31). Examples range 
from scientific research commons, including data, literature, and 
research materials (32), to intellectual property pools, entrepre-
neurial/user innovation commons, rare-disease clinical research 
consortia, open-source software projects, and Wikipedia (31). Un-
derstanding how such communities share and develop knowledge 
is crucial in today’s “information society.” 
Following Ostrom (2, 33) and Hess and Ostrom (34), we have 
worked to systematize the study of knowledge commons and build 
a new field of interdisciplinary research in which law, econom-
ics, sociology, political science, network science, and other fields 
converge. Dozens of case studies have begun to reveal an empiri-
cal picture of knowledge commons. A representative theme is 
that knowledge commons confront diverse social dilemmas not 
reducible to the simple free rider or tragic commons. Rare-disease 
research consortia, for example, address numerous governance 
challenges, including allocating research funding, authorship 
credit, and other rivalrous resources; overcoming potential anti-
commons dilemmas arising from researchers’ incentives to hoard 
access to patients and their data; maintaining privacy, security, 
and the trust of patients and their families; reducing transaction 
costs of cooperation between widely dispersed researchers; and 
managing interactions with outsiders, such as pharmaceutical 
companies. The diversity of dilemmas is matched by the surprising 
diversity of participants critical to successful collaboration. Har-
din’s sheep-herder must be replaced with researchers, clinicians, 
patients, site coordinators, funders, third-party data custodians, 
and even government officials.
Despite growing evidence, we’re still far from design principles, 
much less strong prescriptions. Yet social demand for trusted gov-
ernance of shared knowledge resources, ranging from medical data 
(35) to algorithmically generated intelligence, is growing, even as 
public trust in governments and markets as sources of governance 
seems tenuous. Many researchers and policymakers understood 
the scope of Ostrom’s commons-based framework as limited, for 
example, to small communities managing local resources. Now, 
more than ever, we need to explore if, when, and how commons 
governance can scale.
The antimicrobial commons
By Angela R McLean13,14 and Christopher Dye13
It has become commonplace (36–38) to refer to the rise of anti-
microbial resistance (AMR) as a tragedy of the commons. Each 
individual wishes to use the common-pool resource of function-
ing antimicrobials whenever they might have a beneficial effect 
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(whether in treating human illness or in raising livestock), but 
overuse accelerates the spread of drug-resistant pathogens, so 
the drugs become useless to all—and therein lies the tragedy. 
One way or another, some individual freedoms must be sacri-
ficed in order to maintain a valuable resource for the common 
good. Whereas Hardin emphasized private or state ownership to 
achieve this, Ostrom argued that those who share in exploiting a 
common-pool resource can develop their own rules to prevent its 
overuse. She identified factors that are conducive to the estab-
lishment of effective institutions to regulate the exploitation of a 
resource: Users have common interests; they place a high value 
on the resource far into the future; users support effective moni-
toring; accurate information is valued and easily communicated; 
and it is feasible to establish binding and enforceable regula-
tions. Ostrom warned that large groups often struggle to govern 
common pool resources and that boundary rules are needed to 
determine rights and responsibilities. 
Many of Ostrom’s observations are starting to be fulfilled in the 
search for solutions to the problems of AMR, even if few people in 
this area explicitly set out to apply her work. The growing threat 
of AMR is increasingly understood by medical professionals, 
policy professionals, and the public alike. The associated discourse 
reflects the common, long-term interests of these diverse users 
(39). The widely accepted need for better surveillance of AMR sig-
nals rising support for effective monitoring and accurate, shared 
information. In a growing search for effective rules, physicians are 
adhering more strictly to evidence-based guidance for diagnos-
ing infections; for infection control in hospitals; for procuring, 
prescribing and dispensing antimicrobials; and for ensuring that 
patients complete treatments. Beyond codes of practice, govern-
ments have in some settings introduced methods of enforcement, 
such as restricting the use of essential drugs to certified treatment 
centres. And public health specialists have called for AMR to be 
included among the International Health Regulations, a legally 
binding agreement to prevent the international spread of disease. 
Last, the global nature of the challenge is acknowledged in the 
World Health Organization’s leadership in developing new norms 
for using existing antimicrobials and investing in new ones (40). 
Some other useful ideas arise when AMR is viewed as a tragedy 
of the commons. For example, a desire not to be seen as selfish 
offers a potential solution: antimicrobial use could be decreased 
if overuse led to loss of good reputation, and rules for appropriate 
prescribing helped establish boundaries of “reputable” behaviors 
(41). Further, the “large groups” problem may be less acute if local 
effects are strong enough that a region or nation can benefit from 
reducing their own usage, even if their neighbors do not (42). 
In 1968, Hardin remarked that the tragedy of the commons 
was understood mostly as a set of special cases rather than as a 
general problem of resource management. The AMR tragedy will 
benefit from the application of the broad principles of governing 
a wide range of common pool resources. That will bring focus, 
for example, to the question of “boundary rules”. Can one country 
ever manage AMR alone, and can AMR for human infections be 
controlled without also controlling agricultural use? Also un-
certain is the best mechanism of control: When are binding and 
enforceable regulations preferred over guidelines and codes of 
practice? How can the principles laid out by Hardin and Ostrom 
guide the creation of new resources (discovery of antimicrobials), 
besides conserving the ones we already have? In the face of these 
pressing questions, taking a broader view of the AMR tragedy, 
and of its resolution, will show how best to govern the antimicro-
bial commons.
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